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Brown v. Lee
319 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2003)

I. Facts
On March 6, 1983, a clerk was reported missing from a convenience store
in Williamston, North Carolina. Police arrived and discovered that money was
missing from the cash register and the store's safe; the clerk's car had also
disappeared. Less than an hour later, police officers stopped Willie Brown
("Brown") who was driving the clerk's car. The car contained the clerk's purse,
a .32 caliber six-shot revolver, a paper bag containing about ninety dollars in
cash, and a toboggan cap with eye holes cut out of it. That aftemoon, the clerk's
body was discovered on a muddy road outside of town. Firearms tests revealed
that the body had been shot six times with the .32 caliber revolver discovered on
Brown.'
Brown was charged with and convicted of first-degree murder and robbery
with a dangerous weapon. During his sentencing phase, the jury was presented
with three aggravating circumstances and it found all three to be present. The
jury was also presented with seven possible mitigating circumstances. The jury
did not find any mitigating circumstances and sentenced Brown to death.2
II. ProceduralHistogy
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Brown's
conviction and sentence of death.3 On March 9, 1987, Brown filed a motion for
appropriate relief ("MAR") in part because the trial court had instructed the jury
that it must agree unanimously on any mitigating factor.4 The court concluded
that Brown was procedurally barred from raising the unanimity issue because he
had not raised it on direct appeal.' In 1990, the United States Supreme Court
6
decided McKoj v. North Caro'na,
which held that a jury must not be instructed to
find unanimously the presence of a mitigating factor because such an instruction
prevents each juror from considering all of the relevant mitigating evidence.7
1. Brown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cit. 2003).
2. Id. at 165-66.
3. Id. at 166.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
7. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990) (holding that a jury shall not be
required to find a mitigating circumstance unanimously).
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Based on the McKoy decision, Brown filed an amended MAR in 1994 and reraised the unanimity issue.' In 1996, the state MAR court determined that the
1987 order which procedurally barred Brown's unanimity claim was a final
judgment; therefore, in 1997 Brown's amended MAR was denied.' Brown filed
a second MAR in 1997 and raised the unanimity issue again, but it too was
rejected."0 Brown sought review of the state court's MAR decisions from the
Supreme Court of North Carolina and the United States Supreme Court, but he
was unsuccessful."
Brown then petitioned the federal district court for habeas relief and raised
eleven constitutional issues, including the unanimity claim. Brown and the State
both filed for summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment to the State. The district court did not review Brown's unanimity claim on
the merits because the state court had procedurally barred it. In 2002, Brown
filed an application for a certificate of appealability ("COA' in part to contest
the district court's decision that it was procedurally barred from hearing his
unanimity claim. The district court granted Brown a certificate of appealability
on this decision. Brown also requested a COA on the denial of his2ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, which the district court refused to issue.'
III Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that there
was no procedural bar to Brown's unanimity claim for habeas relief and it
remanded the case to the district court to be heard on the merits. 3 The Fourth
Circuit also refused to grant Brown a COA regarding his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 4
Brown, 319 F.3d at 166.
8.
9.
Id. at 166-67.
10.
Id. at 167.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. at 164
Brown, 319 F.3d at 164. Brown claimed that counsel had not thoroughly investigated
14.
possible mitigating circumstances. Id. at 175. Brown presented this claim to the state MAR court
and on federal habeas review. Id.at 176. Both courts held an evidentiary hearing, and both courts
concluded that counsel had not been ineffective. Id.The Fourth Circuit also reviewed the record
and concluded that there was not a "substantial showing" of a denial of a constitutional right;
at 177. The United States
therefore, the court denied Brown's request for a COA on this issue. Id.
Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for issuing a COA in Miller-El v. Cockrell. Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct.1029 (2003); see Priya Nath, Case Note, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 407 (2003) (analyzing
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003)). The Court held that a petitioner makes a "substantial
showing" if he demonstrates that reasonable jurists could disagree with the district court's application of AEDPA to his constitutional claim. Milkr-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1034; see 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2)
(stating that a certificate of appealability may not issue unless the applicant makes a "substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right"; part of AEDPA). The Court pointed out that this
standard should require only a threshold inquiry into the merits of the claim. Milr-El,123 S.Ct.
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IV. Analysis
In order to determine if Brown's unanimity claim was rightfully barred, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the state rule which barred the claim was an
"independent and adequate state procedural rule."'" North Carolina General
Statutes Section 15A-1419(a)(3) controlled the state MAR court's decision to bar
procedurally Brown's unanimity claim. 6 Section 15A-1419(a)(3) states that a
court may deny a MAR if the defendant was in a position to raise the issue on a
previous appeal. 7 North Carolina General Statutes Section 15A-1419(b) makes
the denial mandatory unless the defendant can demonstrate good cause and
actual prejudice or if a miscarriage of justice would occur if the claim is not
heard." Because Brown could have raised his unanimity claim on direct appeal,
Section 15A-1419(a)(3) barred the state MAR courts from hearing his claim. 9
When Brown filed for federal habeas relief in district court, these state
procedural bars were still controlling.2' The Fourth Circuit explained that under
the doctrine of procedural default, a habeas court cannot consider constitutional
claims that the state refused to hear" 'pursuant to an independent and adequate
state procedural rule,. . . unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the
default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.' "" In short, Brown did not raise the unanimity claim on
direct appeal; therefore, the state MAR courts determined that the claim was
procedurally barred under Section 15A-1419(a)(3). Because the MAR courts
decided that the claim was procedurally barred under state law, the federal habeas
court was precluded from hearing it.' In order to overcome this hurdle, the
habeas petitioner must prove that the original default was done for cause and

at 1034. The Fourth Circuit made a threshold inquiry into Brown's claim and determined that he

did not make a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. Brown, 319 F.3d at 177.
This portion of Brown is not discussed further in this case note.
15. Brown, 319 F.3d at 169 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)
(explaining the doctrine of procedural default)).
16. Id. at 168 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (2001) (explaining when it is
appropriate for a state MAR court to deny relief).
17. Id. at 169 (quoting § 15A-1419(a)(3)).
18. Id.at 169-70 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(b) (2001) (making application of§ 15A1419(a)(3) mandatory in most cases)).
19. See § 15A-1419(a)(3) (stating that denial of relief is appropriate when a claim could have
been raised on a previous appeal).
20. See Brown, 319 F.3d at 170.
21. Brown, 319 F.3d at 177 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750) (alteration in Brown).
22. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (explaining situations in which federal habeas courts are
precluded from hearing a claim).
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resulted in prejudice or he must prove that the underlying state rule-Section
15A-1419(a) and (b)- is not "independent or adequate."23
The court clarified that a state rule is adequate if it is "firmly established"
and "consistently applied" by the state courts. 24 The rule is independent if it
"does not 'depend[ ] on a federal constitutional ruling.' "25 The Fourth Circuit
has generally found Sections 15A-1419(a) and (b) to be both adequate and
independent grounds for habeas preclusion.26 The court continued and stated
that this fact does not end the inquiry.27 In order to assess adequacy, the court
must determine if Sections 15A-1419(a) and (b) have been consistently applied
to the specific type of constitutional claim at issue-in this case, unanimity
claims.' The court must look to other cases and determine if" 'the particular
procedural bar is applied consistently to cases that are procedurally
analogous-here, cases in which thepartcularclaim raised could have been raised
previously but was not. '""' Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit considered cases in
which the unanimity claim could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not.3°
The State and Brown provided the court with ten cases which fit this profile
and the court reviewed each example. 3 Of the ten cases, six defendants had
their unanimity claims heard on the merits, five in state court and one in federal
habeas.32 Four defendants found their claims procedurally barred under Section
15A-1419(a) 3 This evidence convinced the Fourth Circuit that Section 15A1419(a) had not been applied consistently to unanimity claims; therefore, the
state MAR court's decision to bar the claim was not based on an adequate and
independent state law.' Without an adequate and independent state law ground,
there is no procedural bar to federal habeas review on the merits.3 The Fourth
36
Circuit remanded the case to the federal district court to be heard on the merits.

23. See id.
(explaining situations in which federal habeas courts are not precluded from
hearing a claim).
24. Brown, 319 F.3d at 169 (citingJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (defining
when a state rule is "adequate")).

25.

Id. (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985) (defining when a state rule is

"independent")) (alteration in Brown).
26.
Id.at 170.

27.
28.
29.
Brown).
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.

Id.
Id.
(quoting McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 589 (4th Cir. 2000)) (second emphasis in
Brown, 319 F.3d at 171.
Id.
Id.
at 171-72.
Id.
at 171.
Id.
at 175.
Id.
Brown, 319 F.3d at 177.

20031

BROWN V LEE

. Application in Virginia
Presumably, Brown's attorneys on direct appeal did not raise the unanimity
claim because the Supreme Court of North Carolina had recently held that a
unanimity instruction on mitigators was appropriate. 7 This decision resulted in
a sixteen-year battle to be heard on the merits. The applicable lesson for capital
defense attorneys is to raise each possible constitutional claim on direct appeal,
regardless of the Commonwealth's current stance on the issue. The situation in
which the United States Supreme Court overrules the Commonwealth and a
defendant is procedurally barred from relief should be avoided.
Nevertheless, Brown details exactly how to make a successful "adequate and
independent" state ground argument. Defense attorneys should tailor their
arguments to the applicable language of "consistently applied" and "procedurally
analogous." Moreover, attorneys must research and present evidence of inconsistent applications of the rule to the same type of claim they are raising. The
Fourth Circuit in this case relied heavily on the state court's inconsistent applications to reach a decision. If there are examples in which the barred claim could
have been raised appropriately, but was not, and was nonetheless heard on the
merits, attorneys can overcome the procedural default doctrine in federal habeas
review.
Janice L. Kopec

37.
Id.at 167-68 (citing State v. Kirkley, 302 S.E.2d 144,156-57 (N.C. 1983) (finding no error
in a trial court's jury instruction which required unanimity on each mitigating circumstance)).

